Called by Karl Barth the brilliant Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, this book is finally being recognized as Bonhoeffers magnum opus and one of the most important works of Christian ethics of the last century.

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 49 Heft: 1 Seiten: 1-20.

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 52 Heft: 1 Seiten: 81-97.

ZusammenfassungDas Bekanntwerden der Schriften des Aristoteles im 13. Jahrhundert hat zu einer lebhaften Kommentierung seiner Schriften durch die abendländischen Philosophen und Theologen geführt. Zu ihnen zählt Dietrich von Freiberg. Es fällt auf, daß er häufig in seinen Schriften nicht nur den antiken Philosophen zitiert, sondern auch arabische Philosophen, vor allem Averroes. Das gilt für philosophische Fragen wie die Erkenntnislehre, kaum aber für theologische wie die Eschatologie.Er scheut sich jedoch nicht, die Möglichkeit des selbständigen Bestehens der Akzidentien philosophisch zu untersuchen, (...) da Thomas von Aquin das Transsubstantiationsdogma von 1215 philosophisch zu begründen versuchte. Er zieht, wie Thomas, Aristoteles und seinen arabischen Kommentator heran und weist nach, daß – philosophisch gesehen – die Abtrennbarkeit der Akzidentien von der Substanz unmöglich ist. Damit wird deutlich, daß jedenfalls mit Hilfe der aristotelisch-averroistischen Philosophie die Lehraussage des Transsubstantiationsdogma nicht bewiesen werden kann.SummaryThe introduction of Aristoteles' writings during the 13th century led to a vibrant commentating of his writings by western philosophers and theologians. Among them is Dietrich of Freiberg. One notices, that Dietrich not only quote this antique philosopher, but also Arab philosophers, especially Averroes. This is the case in philosophical questions like the field of realisation, less in theological questions like eschatological ones.Nevertheless, Dietrich does not hesitate to examine from a philosophical point of view the possibility of the independent existence of the akzidenz, as Thomas of Aquin tried to support the doctrine of transubstantiation of 1215 with philosophical arguments. Dietrich uses, like Thomas, Aristotles' and his Arab commentaries and proves – from a philosophical point of view – the impossibility of separating the akzidenz from the substanz. It becomes obvious, that it is of no help to use the Aristotelian-Averroes philosophy to prove the doctrine of transubstantiation. (shrink)

In zwanzig Beiträgen behandelt der vorliegende Sammelband Karl Jaspers in seiner historischen und aktuellen Bedeutung als Psychiater und Philosoph. Das Panorama der verschiedenen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen, die dabei zu Wort kommen und aufeinander Bezug nehmen, reicht von Psychiatrie, Medizingeschichte, Allgemeinmedizin, Philosophie und Soziologie über Zeitgeschichte, Literaturwissenschaft und Kulturgeschichte bis zur Filmwissenschaft. Immer geht es um ein ganzheitliches Menschenbild in programmatischer Orientierung an einer Zielgruppe, die auch den Nicht-Spezialisten umfaßt. Der Band gliedert sich übersichtlich in ”Zugänge“, ”Interpretationen“ und ”Beziehungsfelder“.

At the beginning of the 19th century, chronology is emerging as a historical subdiscipline. Using the example of a draft by Karl Dietrich Hüllmann, a forgotten precursor of economics, the paper pursues effects of cultural and social synchronization. In contrast to the doctrines of his time, Hüllmann surprisingly justifies the origin of the state with reference to the calculation of time: thus, technically produced chronology serves him as an argument that rivals theories of contract based on natural history. (...) German Die Chronologie bildet sich Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts als historische Subdisziplin heraus. Am Beispiel eines Entwurfs von Karl Dietrich Hüllmann, einem vergessenen Vorläufer der Volkswirtschaftslehre, werden kulturelle und gesellschaftliche Synchronisationseffekte verfolgt. Abweichend von den Lehrmeinungen seiner Zeit, begründet Hüllmann überraschenderweise den Ursprung des Staats mit der Zeitrechnung. Er gewinnt mit der technisch erzeugten Chronologie ein Argument, das er in Konkurrenz zu naturhistorisch fundierten Vertragstheorien treten lässt. (shrink)

The struggle that prompted Bonhoeffer’s “unconscious Christianity” offers a concrete illustration of the commonsensical in Rahner’s “anonymous Christian.” Thus Rahner’s theory adds theological coherence to what Bonhoeffer intuited. While Bonhoeffer faced the seeming ineffectiveness of Jesus’ teaching for the majority of Christians in Germany, Rahner faced his church’s view of Augustine’s “massa damnata” through a reexamination of church mission and theological categories. In both theologians, Jesus the God-man is the symbol of God’s communion with “the human” in God’s care for (...) all peoples. The article concludes by asking whether the advent of such Christologies signals an approaching time of greater humility with regard to the Christian path to salvation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Karl Barth and Christian Ethics: Living in Truth by William WerpehowskiJames W. SkillenKarl Barth and Christian Ethics: Living in Truth William Werpehowski BURLINGTON, VT: ASHGATE, 2014. 172 PP. $54.95 (PAPERBACK), $153.00 (CLOTH)In this two-part volume, William Werpehowski aims in part 1 to elucidate Karl Barth's "approach to the nature and source of the good, the divine command in its relation to the personal history of a (...) moral agent, and the place of narrative in Christian ethics" (xii). The author does this both by exposition of Barth's writings and by engaging with the arguments of other students of Barth, including James Gustafson, Stanley Hauerwas, John Webster, Matthew Rose, and Gerald McKenny. The titles of the chapters of part 1 indicate the ground being covered: "Divine Commands and Philosophical Dilemmas," "Command and History," "Narrative and Ethics," and "Realism and Discernment." In part 2 the author presents diverse essays on "virtue, moral practices, and discernment," most of which deal with the rearing and education of children, which shows the author's sympathy with Barth even as he draws on other traditions of Christian ethics.Werpehowski's exposition is generally clear and detailed as he seeks to explain and defend Barth's identification of the norm for human ethics with the subject, Jesus Christ. According to Barth, "humanity's obedience to God … must always be obedience to and conformity with Jesus Christ. He is the criterion by which is measured all demands on our behavior" (6). Furthermore, "God's eternal will is for humanity in Jesus Christ; the normative criterion is identical to God's will and the history it accomplishes" (7). Although the response to God's electing love in Christ should be willing obedience, Barth (with Werpehowski) does not deal substantively with the accountability of those who do not so respond. In the end, for Barth, God's "Yes" in Christ always trumps God's "No" to sin (see 65–69).At times the author's defense of Barth appears to be more a deflection of, than an engagement with, the criticism. One example: the author offers a brief summary of Nigel Biggar's sympathetic criticism of Barth at the point where he believes Barth deals inadequately with human responsibility and accountability. Werpehowski acknowledges the legitimacy of Biggar's point—"that the temporal world of eternal grace may be depicted as our one common world only if creaturely rationality and non-arbitrary moral justification are prominently affirmed" (63); he states that Biggar is trying to save Barth "at his best" from a weakness in his position. Yet Werpehowski's next step is to say that Biggar's correction "is in danger of being an overcorrection" because his [End Page 212] moral justification requirement "belongs more to the periphery of the ethics of [Barth's] divine command" (64). That requirement, says Werpehowski, "must be governed by the central significance of the gracious God who commands in the reality of the ethical event" (64).Werpehowski's book is worthy of careful study, especially by those who want to understand Barth in relation to other ethicists. A criticism I have concerns the limits of Barth's ethics with respect to human institutions and social practices for which humans bear communal responsibility. Werpehowski acknowledges that those limits are due to Barth's focus on the relation of Christ to the individual person in the "ethical event." By contrast, at a few points in part 2, Werpehowski draws in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who insists that it is in "friendships, families, work, citizenship, and life in the church" where Christ is present preserving and reconciling the world to God (141). Despite all the attention in recent decades to Christian social and political ethics, the author does little with that subject in either his assessment of Barth or in the chapters of part 2.James W. SkillenPresident (retired), Center for Public JusticeCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The German theologian and martyr Dietrich Bonhoeffer is not widely known for engaging with scientific thought, having been heavily influenced by Karl Barth's celebrated stance against natural theology. However, during the period of his maturing theology in prison Bonhoeffer read a significant scientific work, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's The World View of Physics. From this he gained two major insights for his theological outlook. First, he realized that the notion of a "God of the gaps" is futile, not (...) just in science but in other areas of human inquiry. Second, he felt that an infinite universe, as considered by science, would be self-subsistent and could exist as if there were no God. Bonhoeffer replaced Barth's radical critique of religion with the even more extreme view that it is a mere passing phase in history that grown-up humanity can dispense with. At the same time Bonhoeffer began an important critique of Barth's reaction, namely, the latter's retreat to a "positivism of revelation." While Bonhoeffer did not go quite as far as one might like, his approach opened up hopeful avenues for an answer to "the liberal question" and even a revived place for some kind of natural theology. (shrink)

Agents are often assumed to have degrees of belief (“credences”) and also binary beliefs (“beliefs simpliciter”). How are these related to each other? A much-discussed answer asserts that it is rational to believe a proposition if and only if one has a high enough degree of belief in it. But this answer runs into the “lottery paradox”: the set of believed propositions may violate the key rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure. In earlier work, we showed that this problem (...) generalizes: there exists no local function from degrees of belief to binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions of rationality and non-triviality. “Locality” means that the binary belief in each proposition depends only on the degree of belief in that proposition, not on the degrees of belief in others. One might think that the impossibility can be avoided by dropping the assumption that binary beliefs are a function of degrees of belief. We prove that, even if we drop the “functionality” restriction, there still exists no local relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions. Thus functionality is not the source of the impossibility; its source is the condition of locality. If there is any non-trivial relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs at all, it must be a “holistic” one. We explore several concrete forms this “holistic” relation could take. (shrink)

Does Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics have any affinities with what we have now come to call virtue ethics? If so, what is the relationship between those affinities and the more widely recognized influence of Karl Barth? Moberly seeks to answer these questions through close analysis of the Ethics and engagement with other interpreters of Bonhoeffer, while discussing the nature of virtue ethics in a Christian context. The answers may be surprising, but they are certainly rewarding for anyone wanting to (...) better understand Bonhoeffer and to see how his work could be helpful for current ethical debates. (shrink)

Democratic decision-making is often defended on grounds of the ‘wisdom of crowds’: decisions are more likely to be correct if they are based on many independent opinions, so a typical argument in social epistemology. But what does it mean to have independent opinions? Opinions can be probabilistically dependent even if individuals form their opinion in causal isolation from each other. We distinguish four probabilistic notions of opinion independence. Which of them holds depends on how individuals are causally affected by environmental (...) factors such as commonly perceived evidence. In a general theorem, we identify causal conditions guaranteeing each kind of opinion independence. These results have implications for whether and how ‘wisdom of crowds’ arguments are possible, and how truth-conducive institutions can be designed. (shrink)

We give a review and critique of jury theorems from a social-epistemology perspective, covering Condorcet’s (1785) classic theorem and several later refinements and departures. We assess the plausibility of the conclusions and premises featuring in jury theorems and evaluate the potential of such theorems to serve as formal arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’. In particular, we argue (i) that there is a fundamental tension between voters’ independence and voters’ competence, hence between the two premises of most jury theorems; (ii) (...) that the (asymptotic) conclusion that ‘huge groups are infallible’, reached by many jury theorems, is an artifact of unjustified premises; and (iii) that the (nonasymptotic) conclusion that ‘larger groups are more reliable’, also reached by many jury theorems, is not an artifact and should be regarded as the more adequate formal rendition of the ‘wisdom of crowds’. (shrink)

Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they are competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: whether a premise is justi…ed depends on the notion of probability considered; none of the notions renders both premises simultaneously justi…ed. Under the perhaps most interesting notions, the independence assumption should be weakened.

The Christian does not live in a vacuum, says the author, but in a world of government, politics, labor, and marriage. Hence, Christian ethics cannot exist in a vacuum what the Christian needs, claims Dietrich Bonhoeffer, is concrete instruction in a concrete situation. Although the author died before completing his work, this book is recognized as a major contribution to Christian ethics. The root and ground of Christian ethics, the author says, is the reality of God as revealed in (...) Jesus Christ. This reality is not manifest in the Church as distinct from the secular world such a juxtaposition of two separate spheres, Bonhoeffer insists, is a denial of God's having reconciled the whole world to himself in Christ. On the contrary, God's commandment is to be found and known in the Church, the family, labor, and government. His commandment permits man to live as man before God, in a world God made, with responsibility for the institutions of that world. (shrink)

We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values, and intentions. We define three 'logical' conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness, and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions like preference transitivity. We establish a formal correspondence between our logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome's programme 'rationality through reasoning', we formally characterize how you can (...) (not) become more logical by reasoning. Our analysis connects rationality with logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology. (shrink)

This classic remains one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history.

Nicholas Magni of Jawor (de Jawor/Jauer, von Heidelberg) (1355–1435), a Silesian professor of theology, preacher, and diplomat, was one of the most interesting figures of the first generation of scholars from the University of Heidelberg. Of all his output, it is the treatise De superstitionibus that has attracted the greatest attention so far, while his less known anti-Hussite writings have long been only a research postulate. The work of Jiří Petrášek is, therefore, a long-awaited analysis of the insufficiently recognized writing (...) by Nicholas Magni: Contra epistolam perfidiae Hussitarum, which is a response to the Taborite Manifesto from 1430. In his work, Petrášek draws new conclusions: regarding Nicolas Magni’s views on indulgences, the author points to the borrowings from Henry of Langenstein, and he does not share the earlier statement of Franz X. Bantle about the originality of the Heidelbergian theologian’s views on indulgences and their essence confined to the notion of “communication”. Thus, we receive a work that verifies the previous findings on the anti-Hussite views of Nicholas Magni, and which thoroughly introduces us into the less known areas of the 15th century Catholic anti-Hussite polemics. (shrink)

Kant's Reason develops a novel interpretation of Kant’s conception of reason and its philosophical significance, focusing on two claims. First, it argues that Kant presents a powerful model for understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason as two manifestations of a unified capacity for theoretical and practical understanding (or “comprehension”). This model allows us to do justice to the deep commonalities between theoretical and practical rationality, without reducing either to the other. In particular, through it, we see why the (...) activities of both theoretical and practical reason are governed by a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, while also seeing why reason is essentially autonomous. At the same time, Kant's Reason also reads Kant as presenting us with a compelling picture of the role that reason (as a capacity or power) should play in a systematic approach to foundational philosophical questions. In doing so, it argues for an account of the fundamental norms that apply to rational beings that treats as fundamental neither substantive reasons or values nor merely structural rationality, but instead a robust conception of reason as a power or capacity — namely, the capacity for theoretical and practical understanding. The result is a form of “rational constitutivism” – one which contrasts both with the forms of “reasons fundamentalism” that are currently fashionable and the forms of “agency-first constitutivism” that have dominated much of Kantian metaethics. In this sense, the aim of the book is to vindicate Kant’s insistence that his philosophy represents nothing more or less than reason’s implicit self-understanding coming to explicit and systematic self-consciousness. (shrink)

Living organisms are exposed to numerous influencing factors. This holds also true for their infrastructures that are processing and transducing information like endocrine networks or nerval channels. Therefore, the ability to compensate for noise is crucial for survival. An efficient mechanism to neutralise disturbances is instantiated in form of parallel complementary communication channels exerting antagonistic effects at their common receivers. Different signal processing types share the ability to suppress noise, to widen the system’s regulation capacity, and to provide for variable (...) gains while leaving the transferred signal to a large extent unchanged. (shrink)

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

Criticizing Lacan and Levinas, and starting from Freud and Lacan’s denial of the womb and from the Genius-Male-Hero, who is self-creating and holds the power of creation and thus depends on the elimination of the birth-giving begetting mother, I continue my research to formulate a feminine difference that is neither dependency/disguise nor revolt and struggle in the phallic texture. Unlike other ideas concerning the difference of the feminine, the originary difference that I call matrixial supplies a measure of difference that (...) functions between a woman and a woman, and not only between a man and a woman. With the concepts of the Matrixial, metramorphosis, border-swerving, borderlinking, I outline how both male and female subjects have access to the matrixial sphere and might, as artists, become a ‘woman-artist’; how the Matrixial dissolves the concept of the unitary, separate phallic subject; and how female bodily specificity allows the conceptualization of a field of co-affectivity, shareability and transmissibility. I develop the aesthetic and psychic value of the matrixial voice and its resonance as trans-subjective, based upon a psychic Encounter-Event. Even though the matrixial difference refers both primarily and on the levels of the Imaginary and the Symbolic to the female body – womb, fetus, gestation, pregnancy provide its corpo-real basis – the Matrixial is formulated in terms of a transgressive stratum of subjectivation, where unconscious trans-subjectivity occurs due to particular links and transmission between partial-subjects and partial-objects in co-emergence and co-fading. (shrink)

Popper formulates and explains his non-justificationist theory of knowledge. Science--empirical science--aims at true explanatory theories, yet it can never prove, finally establish, or justify any of its theories as true, not even if it is in fact a true theory. Science must continue to question and criticize all its theories, even those which happen to be true.